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Abstract 
Purpose – This study assesses the effect of time-dynamic financial globalisation uncertainty on 
financial development in 53 African countries for the period 2000-2011. 
 
Design/methodology/approach – Financial globalisation uncertainty is estimated as time-
dynamic to capture business cycle disturbances while all dimensions identified by the Financial 
Development and Structure Database of the World Bank are employed, namely: financial depth 
(money supply and liquid liabilities), financial system efficiency (at banking and financial 
system levels), financial system activity (from banking system and financial system 
perspectives) and financial size.  The empirical evidence is based on the Generalised Method of 
Moments with forward orthogonal deviations. 
 
Findings- The following findings are established.  First, financial globalisation uncertainty does 
not significantly affect money supply, financial system deposits and financial size. Second, the 
uncertainty increases banking system efficiency, banking system activity and financial system 
activity. Moreover, the positive effects are consistently driven by above-median uncertainty 
levels. 
 
Practical implications- It follows that uncertainty in foreign capital flows may be a disguised 
advantage for domestic financial development, especially in dealing with the substantially 
documented issue of surplus liquidity in African financial institutions. Moreover, the sceptical 
view in the financial globalisation literature that ‘allocation efficiency’ is only plausible in the 
absence of uncertainty/instability is not substantiated by the findings. Justifications for the 
nexuses and other policy implications are discussed.  
 
Originality/value- To the best of our knowledge this is the first study to assess the effects of 
financial globalisation uncertainty on financial development in Africa using time-dynamic 
measurements of financial globalisation uncertainty and all dimensions identified by the 
Financial Development and Structure Database of the World Bank. 
 
JEL Classification: F02; F21; F30; F40; O10 
Keywords: Banking; Financial integration; Development 
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1. Introduction 
 Developing countries that had been experiencing surges in foreign capital flows have had 
to also experience a decline in the same capital flows during the recent global financial crisis
1
 
(Kose et al., 2011). Uncertainty in financial flows has resurfaced the longstanding debate about 
whether the advantages of recent financial engineering far outweigh their development 
inconveniences (Rodrik & Subramanian, 2009). In essence, the rewards of financial globalisation 
to developing countries remain an open debate. While moderate consensus has been established 
on the rewards of trade globalisation (Asongu, 2014a), benefits from financial globalisation 
remain very conflicting, with a post 2007-2008 financial crisis strand of the literature 
substantially documenting the downsides of complete capital account openness, inter alia: Kose 
et al. (2011) on the risk of financial globalisation without solid domestic initial conditions; 
Prasad and Rajan (2008) on the imperative of incorporating country-specific features and 
Asongu and De Moor (2015) on the relevance of financial globalisation thresholds for positive 
domestic development outcomes.  
Consistent with the theoretical underpinnings motivating recommendations for complete 
financial globalisation: (i) less developed countries which are labour-rich and capital-poor are 
rewarded with more access to foreign capital needed for investment and growth whereas (ii) 
developed countries benefit from less volatile output (Asongu  & De Moor, 2015a). The 
theoretical basis argues that financial globalisation is a mechanism for risk sharing and capital 
allocation efficiency (Kose et al., 2006, 2011). Fischer (1998) and Summers (2000) are in 
accordance with the position that enhanced financial integration has benefited both developing 
nations and developed countries, notably by consolidating economic stability in the latter and 
enabling the former to make transitions for low- to middle-income.  
Conversely, a stream of the literature has also documented the questionable economics of 
financial globalisation by arguing that the phenomenon fuels global financial instability which 
has substantial negative externalities on development outcomes (Stiglitz, 2000; Rodrik, 1998; 
Bhagwati, 1998). According to Asongu (2014a), some narratives are supportive of the view that 
the concept of financial globalisation is a hidden agenda to extend the benefits of international 
trade in commodities to trade in assets.  
                                                          
1
 For simplicity, the terms ‘financial crisis’ ‘financial crises’, crisis and crises are used interchangeably throughout 
the study.  
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The above debate is relevant to Africa within the framework of financial globalisation in 
financial development outcomes for at least a fourfold reason: recent global poverty trends; 
surplus liquidity issues in African financial institutions; the need for foreign investment to 
finance Africa’s growing needs/projects and gaps in the literature assessing the impacts of 
globalisation on the continent’s development.  
First, an April 2015 World Bank report on attainment of Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) has revealed that extreme poverty has been declining in all regions of the world with the 
exception of Africa (World Bank, 2015). Given that financial development is poverty-inhibiting 
(Efobi et al., 2015), the role of finance remains crucial for the post-2015 development agenda 
(Asongu & De Moor, 2015b). Second, a major concern in African financial development 
literature is the issue of surplus liquidity in financial institutions that is limiting financial access 
to households and corporations (see Saxegaard, 2006; Fouda, 2009; Asongu, 2014b). Third, 
African business literature is also consistent on the position that Africa’s growing ambitions and 
projects require considerable external financial sources like foreign direct investment (see 
Bartels et al., 2009; Tuomi, 2011; Darley, 2012).  Fourth, as far as we know, 2007-2008 financial 
crisis literature focusing on financial globalisation on the continent has failed to address the 
incidence of financial globalisation uncertainty on financial development.  
To the best of our knowledge, the post-crisis literature on the nexus between financial 
globalisation and development outcomes has failed to address the highlighted concern of 
financial globalisation uncertainty. Accordingly, the extant literature has focused on, inter alia: 
financial flows in terms of aid, remittances and foreign direct investment (FDI) and other 
macroeconomic outcomes (see Massa & Te Velde, 2008; Allen & Giovannetti, 2010; Arieff et 
al., 2010); growth effects (see Brambila-Macias & Massa, 2010; Chauva & Geis, 2011; Price & 
Elu, 2014) and financial development  (Massa & Te Velde, 2008; Asongu, 2014a; Motelle & 
Biekpe, 2015; Asongu & De Moor, 2015a). In essence, some inquiries have been positioned on: 
(i) examining the effects on remittances and foreign aid (e.g. Arieff et al., 2010);   (ii) employing 
trade (Allen & Giovannetti, 2010) and finance (Elu & Price, 2014) as mechanisms to growth 
externalities from the crisis; (iii) providing evidence from selected countries with globally-
integrated financial markets (Massa & Te Velde, 2008); (iv) articulating the importance of FDI 
as a channel through which financial globalisation has influenced growth (Brambila-Macias & 
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Massa, 2010) and (v) investigating financial globalisation conditions/thresholds for rewards in 
domestic financial development (Asongu, 2014a; Asongu & De Moor, 2015a).  
Noticeably, the above literature leaves room for improvement in three main areas. First, 
there is rare focus on financial development effects from financial globalisation. Moreover, 
studies on stock market development have limited policy implications because they are focused 
on a selected number of African countries with globally-integrated and well-functioning 
financial markets (see Massa & Te Velde, 2008). In essence, policy implications provided by 
studies focused on financial markets have limited relevance because most African countries do 
not have well-functioning and globally-integrated financial markets (Alagidede et al., 2011, p. 
1333). The selective positioning of inquiries is not exclusively limited to ‘stock market’-oriented 
investigations, but well extends to the financial intermediary sector (Elu & Price, 2014; Motelle 
& Biekpe, 2015). Moreover, Elu and Price (2014) have only engaged the financial intermediary 
sector as a channel between global financial instability and economic growth.  
Second, as far as we have reviewed, with the exception of a study by Massa and Te Velde 
(2008) which has appreciated financial globalisation in terms of FDI (on selected countries 
though), there has been limited scholarly emphasis on FDI externalities to financial development 
in the post-crisis literature. Accordingly, in light of the discourse above, for the most part, 
remittances and foreign aid have been used to appreciate external flows. To put this point into 
perspective, an inquiry by Arieff et al. (2010) which has presented a comprehensive account of 
financial globalisation effects, does not engage FDI, in spite of the plethora of engaged 
institutional and macroeconomic outcomes, namely: fiscal and trade balances, foreign aid, 
remittances, political stability, poverty reduction and    fiscal balances. Third, to the best of our 
knowledge, extant literature has failed to engage uncertainty in financial globalisation. In 
essence, Asongu (2014a) and Asongu and De Moor (2015a) which are closest to the current 
inquiry have focused on investigating respectively financial development and financial 
globalisation thresholds for the materialisation of domestic financial development benefits from 
financial globalisation.  
This study contributes to the literature by filling underlined gaps. It assesses the effect of 
financial instability/uncertainty
2
 on financial development in 53 African countries for the period 
                                                          
2
 Consistent with Lensink and Morrissey (2000) and Kangoye (2013), the terms instability and uncertainty are used 
interchangeably throughout the study.  
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2000-2011. For this purpose, it employs all dimension identified by the Financial Development 
and Structure Database (FDSD) of the World Bank
3
. Financial globalisation uncertainty is 
computed as time-dynamic
4
. At least two advantages are associated with this time-dynamic 
computation of uncertainty. First, the measure of FDI uncertainty is intended to be distinct from 
simple variations in order to capture unanticipated changes in FDI inflows. Second, the use of 
lengthy periodic data averages in main stream literature (e.g. Kangoye, 2013 with ten year 
averages) to compute uncertainty mitigates short-run or business cycle disturbances that are 
essential in the conception and measurement of uncertainty. Hence, the approach used to 
compute uncertainty by this study does not mitigate what it attempts to calibrate. The empirical 
evidence is based on 53 African countries and Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) with 
forward orthogonal deviations.  
The rest of the study is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews relevant literature on the 
nexus between financial globalisation and development outcomes. The data and methodology are 
covered in Section 3. Section 4 discusses the results and some implications while Section 5 
concludes with future directions and further implications.    
 
2. Financial globalisation uncertainty and development  
2.1 Conflicting views in the literature   
 The debate on whether the decision of complete capital account openness is rewarding or 
not for domestic development remains open in scholarly and policy-making circles. In 
accordance with Asongu (2014a), two main strands in the literature can be used to elicit the 
underlying debate in developing countries. 
 The first strand documenting potential benefits in terms of ‘allocation efficiency’ builds 
on the neoclassical growth theory for the most part (Solow, 1956). The neoclassical model is 
typically consistent with the assumptions that capital account liberalisation is a means to 
international risk sharing.  Moreover, poor countries that are scarce in financial resources but 
wealthy in labour are provided more access to financial resources needed for investment, growth 
and catch-up with the developed world. Obstfeld (1998), Fischer (1998), Rogoff (1999), 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
3
 Employed financial dimensions include: financial depth (overall money supply and financial system deposits); 
financial efficiency (at banking and financial system levels); financial activity (from banking and financial system 
perspectives) and financial size.  
4
 Please see the methodology section for more insights.  
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Summers (2000) and Batuo and Asongu (2015) are consistent with the perspective that 
developing countries can benefit from higher investment, reduced cost of capital, higher 
standards of living and pro-poor growth as a result of financial globalisation. These arguments 
have been advanced by many developing countries to justify capital account liberalisation 
decisions over the past decades.  
 Another strand of the literature considers financial globalisation as a fanciful attempt to 
extend benefits from trade in international commodities to international trade in assets (Asongu, 
2014a). According to this anti-thesis, the benefits of financial globalisation are increasingly 
being blurred by, inter alia: uncertainty, financial crisis, contagion as well as growing external 
debt dependence that is deteriorating business cycles (Leung, 2003), fuelling inequality 
(Azzimonti et al., 2014) and reducing productivity and efficiency (Mulwa et al., 2009).  
 
2.2 The recent financial crisis, uncertainty and development in Africa  
 Consistent with Asongu et al. (2015), the recent financial crisis has provided yet more 
evidence of the uncertain/unstable character of financial globalisation. According to the authors, 
the relevant literature pertaining to African development can be discussed in three main strands, 
namely, uncertainty in: growth, financial flows (e.g. FDI, aid and remittances) and other 
macroeconomic outcomes and, financial development.  
 Brambila-Macias and Massa (2010) in the first strand have assessed the relationship 
between private capital flows and economic growth in 15 African countries between 1980-2008. 
The authors have concluded that due to uncertainty in financial flows, it was very likely that the 
financial crisis would engender negative externalities on the continent’s economic performance. 
In another study, Chauva and Geis (2011) document a comprehensive analysis on a number of 
factors related to uncertainty and the crisis, notably: effects of the crisis on economic prosperity; 
importance of various transmission channels; monetary and fiscal policy challenges in responses; 
medium- and long-run issues related to sustainable recovery and hedges against future crises. 
The paper concludes that compared to a recent past, variations in the constituents of GDP are not 
significantly different from those witnessed as a result of the recent financial crisis. Price and Elu 
(2014) investigate whether macroeconomic shocks are amplified by regional currency 
integration in the face of uncertainty and financial crisis. Using the case study of the Central 
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African Franc Zone (CFAZ), the authors have established that growth-inhibiting credit 
contraction has been more apparent in countries within the CFAZ.  
 In the second strand on the impact on capital flows and other macroeconomic outcomes, 
Allen and Giovannetti (2010) have investigated channels through which the crisis has affected 
African fragile states to establish that remittances and trade have been important mechanisms. 
Arieff et al. (2010) emphasis that despite the initial optimism displayed in some academic and 
policy-making circles that Africa may not have been substantially affected by the crisis, it was 
estimated that average rates of growth would decline in 2009. The authors examine Africa’s 
exposure to the crisis as well as implications for poverty alleviation, economic growth, political 
stability and fiscal balances. Massa and Te Velde (2008) investigate if eight successful countries 
run the risk of witnessing adverse effects in the wake of the financial crisis to establish that the 
crisis has been transmitted through strong reliance on: (i) tourism, remittances stock markets (e.g 
Kenya and Uganda); (ii) international reserves and deficits (in current and fiscal account) (e.g 
Ghana) and (iii) FDI and foreign-owned banks (e.g. Tanzania, Mozambique, Mali and Ghana).  
 In the third strand, to the best of our knowledge, uncertainty-related studies that have 
been oriented towards financial development have either been focused on selected African 
countries, positioned on stock markets or used financial development as a mechanism to other 
macroeconomic outcomes. Accordingly, whereas Elu and Price (2014) have used financial 
contraction as a channel to economic growth, Motelle and Biekpe (2015) have assessed and 
confirmed the hypothesis that financial sector instability is fuelled by enhanced financial 
integration in the Southern African Development Community (SADC). As highlighted above, 
the focus by Massa and Te Velde (2008) on financial markets has been limited to a selected few 
countries with well-functioning and globally-integrated stocks markets. They have established 
that the stock market of Kenya plummeted by about 40% due to uncertainty related to the crisis. 
How the present inquiry steers clear of discussed studies and contributes to extant literature have 
been discussed in the introduction.  
  
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data  
 The study investigates a sample of 53 African countries for the period 2000-2011 using 
data from African Development Indicators (ADI) and the Financial Development and Structure 
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Database (FDSD) of the World Bank. The justification for positioning the inquiry on Africa has 
been provided in the introduction. The periodicity has a twofold motivation: (i) the need to 
provide results with more updated policy outcomes and (ii) the adopted empirical strategy 
requires that N(53)>T(12). Moreover, the latter is also for the purpose of restricting identification 
and limiting instrument proliferation, which can bias estimated results from Generalised Method 
of Moments (GMM).  
Financial globalisation uncertainty is measured as the standard error corresponding to the 
first auto-regressive process of Net FDI inflows. Consistent with Asongu and De Moor (2015a), 
adopted dependent variable consists of all dimensions of the FDSD, namely: depth (at overall 
economic and financial system levels)
5
, efficiency (banking and financial system efficiency)
6
, 
activity (banking and financial system activity)
7
 and size
8
. Therefore, with the exception of 
financial size, two indicators are used for each financial dimension for the purpose of robustness 
checks. 
 In accordance with Asongu and De Moor (2015a), five control variables are adopted, 
namely: public investment, inflation, GDP growth, trade openness and foreign aid. First, both 
empirical (Boyd et al., 2001) and theoretical (Huybens & Smith, 1999) literature support the 
view that higher levels of inflation are associated with smaller, less active and less efficient 
financial markets. Hence, low/stable inflation should be associated with higher levels of financial 
                                                          
5
 “Borrowing from the FDSD, this paper measures financial depth both from overall-economic and financial system 
perspectives with indicators of broad money supply (M2/GDP) and financial system deposits (Fdgdp) respectively. 
While the former denotes the monetary base plus demand, saving and time deposits, the later indicates liquid 
liabilities. Since we are dealing exclusively with developing countries, we distinguish liquid liabilities from money 
supply because a substantial chunk of the monetary base does not transit through the banking sector” (Asongu, 
2014a, p. 189).  
6
 “By financial intermediation efficiency here, this study neither refers to the profitability-oriented concept nor to 
the production efficiency of decision making units in the financial sector (through Data Envelopment Analysis: 
DEA). What we seek to highlight is the ability of banks to effectively fulfill their fundamental role of transforming 
mobilized deposits into credit for economic operators (agents). We adopt proxies for banking-system-efficiency and 
financial-system-efficiency (respectively ‘bank credit on bank deposits: Bcbd’ and ‘financial system credit on 
financial system deposits: Fcfd’)” (Asongu, 2014a, pp.189-190).   
7
 “By financial intermediary activity here, the work highlights the ability of banks to grant credit to economic 
operators.  We proxy for both banking intermediary activity and financial intermediary activity with “private 
domestic credit by deposit banks: Pcrb” and “private credit by domestic banks and other financial institutions: 
Pcrbof” respectively” (Asongu, 2014a, p. 190).  
8
 According to the FDSD, financial intermediary size is measured as the ratio of “deposit bank assets” to “total 
assets” (deposit bank assets on central bank assets plus deposit bank assets: Dbacba).  
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development. Second, the positive relationship between financial development and investment 
has been established by Huang (2011) in an increasingly globalised world. Third, there is some 
consensus in the literature on the position that openness-friendly policies are conducive to 
financial development (Do & Levchenko, 2004; Huang & Temple, 2005). Fourth, a growing 
economy engenders rewards in financial development as a result of decreasing cost in financial 
intermediation, due to: more availability of funds for productive investments and enhanced 
competition (Levine, 1997). Fifth, foreign aid can either increase or decrease financial 
development depending on the allocated amount that is actually invested in recipient countries. 
In essence, whereas the effect is very likely to be positive if a substantial portion of allocated 
funds is invested in countries of destination, the effects may also be insignificant/negative if a 
great chunk of disbursed funds is either: spent in donor countries or siphon by corrupt officials in 
recipients countries and concealed in tax havens.  
 Sources and definitions of variables are disclosed in Appendix 1. The correlation matrix 
and summary statistics are provided in Appendix 3 and Appendix 2 respectively. According to 
the ‘summary statistics’: (i) variables can be compared on the basis of their means and (ii) 
reasonably estimated linkages can emerge given the substantial degrees of variations displayed 
by corresponding standard deviations.  The objective of the correlation matrix is to reduce 
concerns about multicollinearity. These concerns are exclusively apparent among financial 
development variables which display high degrees of substitution. The underlying concerns do 
not pose specification issues because the financial development variables are exclusively 
employed as dependent variables in distinct specifications.   
 
3.2 Methodology 
3.1 Computation of uncertainty/instability   
In accordance with Kangoye (2013) and Lensink and Morrissey (2000), GARCH (Generalized 
Auto-Regressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity) models are not appropriate for the estimation 
of uncertainties because they are better fit for high frequency data. They recommend the use of 
first-order autoregressive processes for the purpose when the frequency of employed data is 
annual. Hence, we use first-autoregressive processes of FDI inflows. Instead of using less 
dynamic standard errors associated with data averages, we compute time-dynamic standard 
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errors with the rollreg Stata command and save the RMSE
9
 (Root-Mean Square Error) of each 
country as a measurement of uncertainty. The computation of uncertainty is time-dynamic 
because contrary to Kangoye (2013) which is based on ten year intervals, the process uses a 
moving window of four. Hence, more time-dynamic properties are accounted-for, in spite of the 
inevitable loss of four of degrees of freedom for each country
10
. 
 The computation of uncertainty is summarised by the following equation.  
tititi TFIFI ,1,,            (1) 
where tiFI ,  is net FDI inflows of country i  at time t ; 1, tiFI  
is net FDI inflows of country i  at 
time 1t  ; T the time trend; the constant ;
 
  the lagged parameter and ti ,  the forecast error.  
Uncertainty is measured by computing for each country the RMSE corresponding to Eq (1). 
Given that we have a four-year moving window and a time series of twelve years for each 
country, the regression output reveals eight RMSE for each country. Moreover at least two 
advantages are associated with this time-dynamic computation of uncertainty. First, the measure 
of FDI uncertainty is intended to be distinct from simple variations in order to capture 
unanticipated changes in FDI inflows. Second, the use of data averages (e.g. Kangoye, 2013) to 
compute uncertainty over a long period of time mitigates short-run or business cycle 
disturbances that are essential in the conception and measurement of uncertainty. Hence, the 
approach in this study does not mitigate what it attempts to calibrate.  
 
3.2 Empirical approach  
 In accordance with Asongu and De Moor (2015a), the study adopts a GMM approach for 
five principal reasons. Whereas the first-two are requirements for adopting the empirical 
approach, the last-three are advantages associated with employing the empirical strategy. First, 
the estimation technique is a good fit because of persistence in the dependent variables. In 
essence, the rule of thumb threshold of 0.800 required for persistence is confirmed from 
Appendix 4 in which the lowest correlation between the dependent variables and their 
                                                          
9
Consistent with Kitagawa and Okuda (2013), the RMSE (Root-Mean-Square Error) can be used to measure 
uncertainty or standard deviation of residuals.  
10
 It is important to note that in the computation of time-dynamic uncertainty, the specification is such that we lose 
four degrees of freedom for each country because, consistent with the Stata rollreg command, the rolling window 
should be higher than the independent variables by at least one degree of freedom. We have three independent 
variables in the autoregressive process, namely: a constant, a time trend and the lagged FDI variable.  
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corresponding lagged values is 0.9282. Second, N>T because: the number of countries (N) and 
years per country (T) are respectively 53 and 12. Third, the approach controls for endogeneity in 
all regressions. Fourth, the technique accounts for cross-country variations. Fifth, potential 
concerns about small sample biases in the difference estimator are mitigated by the system 
estimator. It is principally for this fifth reason that Bond et al. (2001, pp. 3-4) have recommended 
the system GMM estimator (Arellano & Bover, 1995; Blundell & Bond, 1998) because it 
addresses the highlighted shortcoming in the difference estimator (Arellano & Bond, 1991).  
 This study adopts the Roodman (2009ab) extension of Arellano and Bover (1995) which 
uses forward orthogonal deviations as opposed to differences. This approach has been 
documented to limit instrument proliferation and account for cross-sectional dependence (see 
Love & Zicchino, 2006; Baltagi, 2008). In the specification, a two-step approach is adopted 
because it accounts for heteroscedasticity. Accordingly, the one-step specification is 
homoscedasticity-consistent.  
The following equations in levels (2) and first difference (3) summarize the standard 
system GMM estimation procedure.  
 tititih
h
htititi WFUFDFD ,,,
5
1
,2,10,    

                              (2)     
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Where: tiFD ,  
is a financial development dynamic (depth, efficiency, activity or size) of country 
i
 
at  period t ;  is a constant;
 
 represents tau ;  FU , Financial globalisation uncertainty; W  is 
the vector of control variables  (GDP growth, inflation, public investment, foreign aid and trade 
openness),
 i

 
is the country-specific effect, t  
is the time-specific constant  and ti ,  the error 
term. In the specification, we prefer the two-step to the one-step procedure because it is 
heteroscedasticity-consistent. 
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4. Empirical results 
4.1 Presentation of results 
 The findings corresponding to ‘financial depth’, ‘financial efficiency’, and ‘financial 
activity and size’ are provided in Tables 1, 2 and 3 respectively. Each of the tables consists of 
three specifications, corresponding to the: full sample; sub-sample with above-median FDI 
uncertainty (FDIUn>M) and sub-sample with below (or equal) median FDI (FDIUn≤M)11. The 
use of median as a sub-sampling criterion has a twofold motivation. First, it avails room for more 
policy implications by providing more dynamics in FDI uncertainty. In essence, the degree of 
uncertainty may also affect estimated coefficients. Second, for the underlying comparative 
purpose, a median enables sub-sampling symmetry.  
In accordance with Asongu and De Moor (2015a), four main information criteria are used 
to examine the validity of estimated models. First, the alternative hypothesis of the second-order 
Arellano and Bond autocorrelation test (AR(2)) in difference for the presence of autocorrelation 
in the residuals should be rejected.  Second, the alternative hypotheses corresponding to the 
Sargan and Hansen over-identification restrictions (OIR) tests should also be rejected because 
they are consistent with the position that the instruments are correlated with the error or not 
valid. It is important to note that the Sargan (Hansen) OIR test is not robust (robust) but not 
weakened (weakened) by instruments. It is in this light that the specifications are tailored to limit 
instrument proliferation (or restrict over-identification) by ensuring that the number of countries 
in every specification is higher than the associated number of instruments. Moreover, OIR tests 
are further assessed with the Difference in Hansen Test (DHT) for exogeneity of instruments in 
order to ascertain the validity of Hansen OIR results. Fourth, a Fischer test for the joint validity 
of estimated coefficients is also disclosed.  
The following findings can be established from Table 1 on ‘financial globalisation 
uncertainty and financial depth’. First, the effect of FDI uncertainty is neither significant on 
money supply on the left-hand-side (LHS), nor on financial system deposits on the right-hand-
side (RHS). Second, with the exception of GDP growth which consistently displays an 
unexpected negative sign, the significant control variables have expected signs for the most part. 
The unexpected effect of GDP may be traceable to ongoing concerns about immiserizing growth 
                                                          
11
 For simplicity in presentation and purpose of readability the ‘sub-sample with below-median FDIUn’ is used to 
refer to the ‘sub-sample with below (or equal) median FDIUn’.  
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in Africa. In essence, despite of the continent enjoying over two decades of growth resurgence 
that began in the mid 1990s (Fosu, 2015, p. 44), a recent World Bank report on poverty for 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) targets has revealed that extreme poverty has been 
declining in all regions of the world with the exception of Africa (World Bank, 2015).  
 
Table 1: Financial Depth and Financial Globalisation Uncertainty  
       
 Financial Depth 
       
 Economic Depth (Money Supply) Financial System Depth (Deposits) 
 Full Sample FDIUn ≤M FDIUn>M Full Sample FDIUn ≤M FDIUn>M 
Constant  -1.410 -0.072 -2.594** -1.274 -1.417 -3.320*** 
 (0.333) (0.958) (0.012) (0.395) (0.378) (0.001) 
Money Supply (-1) 1.026*** 0.973*** 1.008*** --- --- --- 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
Financial System Deposits (-1) --- --- --- 1.039*** 1.022*** 1.032*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
FDIUn  -0.007 -0.398 0.0009 0.017 -0.271 -0.016 
 (0.903) (0.342) (0.976) (0.739) (0.370) (0.368) 
GDP growth  -0.209*** -0.192* -0.136*** -0.065* -0.043 -0.079*** 
 (0.000) (0.055) (0.000) (0.051) (0.357) (0.000) 
Inflation -0.021*** -0.020*** 0.021 -0.017*** -0.017*** 0.019 
 (0.000) (0.005) (0.367) (0.001) (0.000) (0.301) 
Public Investment  -0.061* 0.024 0.046 0.003 0.050 0.034 
 (0.065) (0.580) (0.103) (0.884) (0.182) (0.209) 
Foreign Aid  0.070 0.078 0.004 0.061* 0.035 0.002 
 (0.113) (0.183) (0.747) (0.098) (0.416) (0.853) 
Trade  0.032** 0.045*** 0.031*** 0.020 0.036** 0.030*** 
 (0.021) (0.000) (0.004) (0.155) (0.048) (0.001) 
       
AR(1) (0.013) (0.041) (0.040) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) 
AR(2) (0.317) (0.272) (0.274) (0.425) (0.279) (0.182) 
Sargan OIR (0.011) (0.009) (0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) 
Hansen OIR (0.079) (0.818) (0.220) (0.227) (0.859) (0.291) 
       
DHT for instruments       
(a)Instruments in levels       
H excluding group (0.134) (0.409) (0.285) (0.071) (0.311) (0.158) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.142) (0.888) (0.249) (0.560) (0.963) (0.482) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))       
H excluding group (0.048) (0.808) (0.100) (0.100) (0.534) (0.180) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.426) (0.576) (0.679) (0.697) (0.976) (0.586) 
       
Fisher  854.74*** 806.18*** 11208.6*** 1198.98*** 869.68*** 2317.38*** 
Instruments  34 34 34 34 34 34 
Countries  46 40 36 46 40 36 
Observations  311 158 156 311 158 153 
       
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. FDIUn: Foreign Direct Investment Uncertainty. FDIUn  median = 1.0248. DHT: 
Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. Dif: Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of 
bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no 
autocorrelation in the AR(1) and AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test.  
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 From Table 2 on the nexus between FDI uncertainty and financial development, the 
following are apparent. First, on the RHS, results corresponding to financial system efficiency 
are not valid because the null hypotheses of the AR(2) test are rejected. Second, FDI uncertainty 
increases banking system efficiency. This finding is driven by the above-median sub-sample. 
Third, the control variables are significant with expected signs because the dependent variables 
of Table 2 are conflicting with those of Table 1. Accordingly, financial allocation efficiency is 
the ability to transform mobilised financial system deposits into credit for economic operators. 
Hence, improving financial allocation efficiency is to the detriment of liquid liabilities or 
financial system deposits.  
 
Table 2: Banking Efficiency and Financial Globalisation Uncertainty 
       
 Financial Efficiency 
       
 Banking System Efficiency (BcBd) Financial System Efficiency (FcFd) 
 Full Sample FDIUn ≤M FDIUn>M Full Sample FDIUn ≤M FDIUn>M 
Constant  18.913*** 16.333*** 11.927*** 7.646** 35.611*** -1.713 
 (0.000) (0.006) (0.001) (0.017) (0.000) (0.339) 
Banking System Efficiency (-1) 0.831*** 0.838*** 0.862*** --- --- --- 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
Financial System Efficiency (-1) --- --- --- 0.944*** 0.905*** 0.965*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
FDIUn  0.420*** -0.547 0.484*** 0.678*** 0.394 0.386*** 
 (0.007) (0.654) (0.000) (0.000) (0.829) (0.000) 
GDP growth  0.252*** 0.505*** 0.019 0.293*** 0.695*** 0.287*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.652) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Inflation 0.0005*** 0.0007*** 0.001 -0.058*** -0.033*** 0.239*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.976) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Public Investment  -0.355*** -0.379** 0.125 0.054 -0.346 0.391*** 
 (0.001) (0.029) (0.147) (0.526) (0.175) (0.000) 
Foreign Aid  -0.365*** 0.004 -0.069 -0.242* -0.993*** 0.123*** 
 (0.003) (0.969) (0.174) (0.052) (0.000) (0.000) 
Trade  0.010 -0.081 -0.030 -0.059*** -0.257*** -0.067*** 
 (0.798) (0.124) (0.147) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
       
AR(1) (0.003) (0.010) (0.005) (0.088) (0.216) (0.218) 
AR(2) (0.132) (0.133) (0.120) (0.004) (0.031) (0.009) 
Sargan OIR (0.161) (0.055) (0.078) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) 
Hansen OIR (0.407) (0.126) (0.778) (0.125) (0.171) (0.562) 
       
DHT for instruments       
(a)Instruments in levels       
H excluding group (0.120) (0.509) (0.480) (0.255) (0.155) (0.775) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.721) (0.076) (0.803) (0.142) (0.286) (0.364) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))       
H excluding group (0.465) (0.312) (0.715) (0.027) (0.114) (0.461) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.330) (0.091) (0.630) (0.871) (0.469) (0.587) 
       
Fisher  281.05*** 541.77*** 2643.32*** 631.34*** 153.32*** 2695.76*** 
16 
 
Instruments  34 34 34 34 34 34 
Countries  46 40 36 46 40 36 
Observations  318 161 157 311 158 153 
       
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. FDIUn: Foreign Direct Investment Uncertainty. FDIUn  median = 1.0248. DHT: 
Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. Dif: Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of 
bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no 
autocorrelation in the AR(1) and AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test.  
 
 
The following findings can be established from Table 3. First, FDI uncertainty has no 
significant effect on financial size. Second, the FDI uncertainty increases financial activity and 
the results are driven by above-median FDI uncertainty levels. This narrative applies to banking 
system activity as well as financial system activity, especially if only significance levels of 5% 
and 1% are considered. Third, most of the significant control variables have expected signs.  
 
 
Table 3: Financial Activity, Financial Size and Financial Globalisation Uncertainty 
          
 Financial Activity Financial Size 
          
 Banking System Activity (Pcrb ) Financial System Activity (Pcrbof)  
 Full Sample FDIUn ≤M FDIUn>M Full Sample FDIUn ≤M FDIUn>M Full Sample FDIUn ≤M FDIUn>M 
Constant  -5.425*** -2.401 -2.416*** -7.224*** -4.760 -2.890*** 14.362*** 15.995*** 0.887 
 (0.003) (0.256) (0.004) (0.000) (0.145) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.649) 
Banking Sys. Activity  (-1) 1.105*** 1.147*** 1.034*** --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)       
Financial  Sys. Activity (-1) --- --- --- 1.132*** 1.222*** 1.071*** --- --- --- 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
Financial Size (-1) --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.795*** 0.854*** 0.910*** 
       (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
FDIUn  0.062 -0.672* 0.053*** 0.086* -0.951** 0.038** -0.101 -0.132 0.024 
 (0.210) (0.057) (0.007) (0.081) (0.049) (0.028) (0.170) (0.822) (0.551) 
GDP growth  0.022 0.123* -0.030*** 0.025 0.108 -0.026** -0.044 0.186 -0.030 
 (0.449) (0.058) (0.006) (0.452) (0.166) (0.025) (0.339) (0.198) (0.315) 
Inflation -0.013*** -0.007* 0.071*** -0.017*** -0.011** 0.058*** -0.068*** -0.058*** 0.072** 
 (0.000) (0.058) (0.000) (0.000) (0.013) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.018) 
Public Investment  -0.013*** 0.140* 0.103*** 0.108*** 0.123 0.110*** 0.070 0.225*** -0.179** 
 (0.000) (0.052) (0.001) (0.005) (0.219) (0.001) (0.289) (0.000) (0.039) 
Foreign Aid  0.028 -0.108*** 0.008 0.016 -0.108*** -0.014 -0.032 -0.374*** -0.024 
 (0.390) (0.000) (0.606) (0.655) (0.008) (0.360) (0.713) (0.002) (0.620) 
Trade  0.033*** 0.013 0.009 0.045*** 0.025 0.014* 0.048** -0.033 0.085*** 
 (0.004) (0.292) (0.179) (0.000) (0.172) (0.063) (0.031) (0.223) (0.000) 
          
AR(1) (0.006) (0.018) (0.032) (0.020) (0.076) (0.066) (0.062) (0.007) (0.110) 
AR(2) (0.198) (0.238) (0.159) (0.064) (0.166) (0.052) (0.640) (0.279) (0.922) 
Sargan OIR (0.000) (0.161) (0.001) (0.000) (0.099) (0.001) (0.006) (0.388) (0.109) 
Hansen OIR (0.352) (0.308) (0.281) (0.253) (0.508) (0.431) (0.422) (0.418) (0.400) 
          
DHT for instruments          
(a)Instruments in levels          
H excluding group (0.259) (0.269) (0.681) (0.328) (0.384) (0.607) (0.454) (0.417) (0.478) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.447) (0.378) (0.154) (0.265) (0.539) (0.315) (0.386) (0.406) (0.348) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))          
H excluding group (0.274) (0.239) (0.099) (0.334) (0.303) (0.607) (0.353) (0.604) (0.440) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.504) (0.485) (0.839) (0.243) (0.749) (0.315) (0.502) (0.221) (0.347) 
          
Fisher  1080.12*** 1429.02*** 16649.9*** 1118.68*** 734.13*** 3599.74*** 696.32*** 848.64*** 6680.68*** 
Instruments  34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 
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Countries  46 40 36 46 40 36 46 40 36 
Observations  311 158 153 313 158 155 313 159 154 
          
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. FDIUn: Foreign Direct Investment Uncertainty. Syst: System.  FDIUn  median = 
1.0248. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. Dif: Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The 
significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null 
hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) and AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test.  
 
 
4.2 Further discussion and policy implications 
The findings are discussed in two main strands, notably: significant nexuses with 
financial development and insignificant relationships.  
In the first strand, we have observed that financial globalisation uncertainty increases 
banking system efficiency, banking system activity and financial system activity. Moreover, the 
positive effects are consistently driven the above-median levels of uncertainty. The accordance 
of findings from dynamics of efficiency and activity is consistent with economic theory because 
financial activity (or credit) automatically increases with financial allocation efficiency: 
transformation of deposits into credit.  It follows that uncertainty in foreign capital flows may be 
a disguised advantage for domestic financial development, especially in terms of dealing with 
the issue of surplus liquidity in African financial institutions. This inference on FDI is broadly 
consistent with recent foreign aid literature. Accordingly, the hypothesis suggests that in the 
absence of foreign aid, governments of recipient countries are more politically accountable has 
been formulated by Eubank (2012) on Somaliland an empirically verified in Africa (Asongu, 
2015). A possible explanation behind the finding being discussed is this that when recipient 
countries are confronted with uncertainty in external flows, they are more likely to improve 
domestic institutions in order to hedge risks associated with the underlying uncertainty. Such 
improvements are not limited to the nexus between foreign aid and political institutions but as 
we have established, well extend to the relationship between FDI inflows and financial 
intermediary institutions. As a policy implication, the substantially documented concern about 
surplus liquidity in African financial intermediary institutions (Saxegaard, 2006; Fouda, 2009) 
which has partially motivated this inquiry can be addressed in the face of uncertainty in FDI 
inflows.  
We devote the second strand to elucidating why effects of FDI uncertainty on financial 
depth (money supply and liquid liabilities) and financial size are not significant. First, the 
insignificant effects on financial system deposits and money supply may be partially traceable to 
the fact in that FDI uncertainty is associated fundamentally with reductions in capital flows since 
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a substantial part of the sample captures the financial crisis and post-crisis periods. Accordingly, 
it is logical to expect decreases in financial system deposit and money supply, resulting from a 
reduced inflow of foreign capital. In essence, such inflows are traditionally deposited in domestic 
bank accounts. Corresponding money supply is improved because it is positively associated with 
financial system deposits. Moreover, the fact that most estimated FDI uncertainty signs are 
insignificantly negative also aligns with the positive effects on financial allocation efficiency and 
financial activity discussed above. Accordingly, financial system efficiency by conception and 
definition develops to the detriment of financial deposits (or liquid liabilities). 
 Second, elucidating the insignificant effect of financial size is not as straight forward 
because we are required to engage components of its definition. Financial size is defined as 
deposit bank asset on total assets. Total assets refer to deposit bank assets plus central bank 
assets. ‘Deposit bank assets’ refers to: (i) money and property owned by banks and (ii) money 
that is owed the banks. While the former partially reflects financial depth, the latter mirrors 
financial activity. We have also observed from the findings that only financial activity is 
positively affected by FDI uncertainty. Hence, a possible explanation of financial size not being 
affected positively could be traceable to how FDI uncertainty affects the proportion of property 
owned by banks. We do not have this data on ‘proportion of property’ but from a logical 
inference, such property is not positively influenced by FDI uncertainty.  
 
5. Concluding implications and future directions 
 
This study complements extant literature by assessing the effect financial globalisation 
uncertainty on financial development in 53 African countries for the period 2000-2011. Financial 
globalisation uncertainty is estimated as time-dynamic to capture business cycle disturbances 
while all dimensions identified by the Financial Development and Structure Database of the 
World Bank are employed, namely: financial depth (money supply and liquid liabilities), 
financial system efficiency (at banking and financial system levels), financial system activity 
(from banking system and financial system perspectives) and financial size. The empirical 
evidence is based on the Generalised Method of Moments with forward orthogonal deviations. 
The following findings are established.  First financial globalisation uncertainty does not 
significantly affect money supply, financial system deposits and financial size. Second, financial 
globalisation uncertainty increases banking system efficiency, banking system activity and 
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financial system activity. Moreover, the positive effects are consistently driven by above-median 
levels of uncertainty. It follows that uncertainty in foreign capital flows may be a disguised 
advantage for domestic financial development, especially in dealing with the substantially 
documented issue of surplus liquidity in African financial institutions. Justifications for the 
nexuses have been discussed.  
 In light of ongoing debates, the findings can be further engaged in five main points that 
double as policy implications. First, from the perspective financial intermediary allocation 
efficiency, findings of the study do not support the sceptical view that the hypothesis of 
‘allocation efficiency’ in financial globalisation is only plausible on the condition that domestic 
economies experience no volatilities (with the exception of barriers to the free movement of 
capital). The position on scepticism has been sustained by Rodrik (1998) and Rodrik and 
Subramanian (2009) with respectively provocative titles like ‘Who Needs Capital-Account 
Convertibility?’ and ‘Why Did Financial Globalization Disappoint?’.  
 Second, the position of Rodrik and Subramanian (2009) that the cost of financial 
globalisation is increasingly apparent because of magnitudes and frequencies of financial crises 
is not partially supported by the results of this inquiry from a financial intermediary development 
stand point. This is essentially because the recent financial crisis period (2007-2008) is part of 
the sampled periodicity.  
 Third, the narrative by Asongu and De Moor (2015a) on the downsides of financial 
instability is not substantiated by our findings. Accordingly, in motivating their inquiry, they 
have argued that there is an inverse nexus between financial instability and, inter alia: quick 
mobilization of productive savings, mitigation of information asymmetry, consolidation of risk-
sharing and efficient allocation of resources.  
 Fourth, given that financial globalisation has become an ineluctable process whose 
challenges can be neglected only by sacrificing the prosperity of nations, we may conclude that 
Dornbush and Fisher were partially right in their positions before the 21
st
 century because, our 
findings demonstrate that domestic economies faced with uncertainty in financial globalisation 
can also take advantage of such uncertainties in boosting the transformation of domestically 
mobilised resources into credit for economic operators. For brevity and lack of space, the 
interested reader can refer to: (i) Stanley Fischer’s famous speech during the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF)’s Annual Meeting in 1997 (Fischer, 1997) and (ii) Dornbusch’s 
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advocacies which considered capital controls as “an idea who’s time had past” (Dornbusch, 
1996) and two years later reaffirmed that “the correct answer to the question of capital mobility 
is that it ought to be unrestricted” (Dornbusch, 1998, p. 20).  
 Fifth, the position by Kose et al. (2011) that developing countries that have depended less 
on foreign capital (due to greater reliance on mobilising domestic savings for investment 
purposes) have been performing comparatively better than their counterparts (of less domestic 
reliance), can be partially substantiated with findings of this study.  
 The inquiry leaves room for extension in a number fronts, notably, repositioning of the 
study with emphasis on inter alia: conditional distributions of financial development, financial 
sector competition and pre- and post-crisis dynamics.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Variable Definitions 
Variables  Signs Variable Definitions Sources 
Economic Financial Depth   M2 Money Supply (% of GDP) World Bank (FDSD) 
    
Financial System Depth   Fdgdp Liquid Liabilities (% of GDP) World Bank (FDSD) 
    
Banking System Efficiency   BcBd Bank credit on Bank deposits World Bank (FDSD) 
    
Financial System Efficiency   FcFd Financial credit on Financial deposits World Bank (FDSD) 
    
Banking  System Activity  Prcb Private domestic credit from deposit banks (% of GDP) World Bank (FDSD) 
    
Financial System Activity Prcbof Private domestic credit from financial institutions (% of GDP) World Bank (FDSD) 
    
Financial Size   Dbacba Deposit bank assets on Central bank assets plus Deposit bank 
assets 
World Bank (FDSD) 
    
Financial Globalization 
Uncertainty  
FDIUn Root Mean Square Error of the first autoregressive process of 
financial globalization.  
Authors’ computation  
    
Economic Prosperity  GDPg GDP Growth (annual %) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Inflation  Infl Consumer Price Index (annual %) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Public Investment   PubIvt Gross Public Investment (% of GDP)  World Bank (WDI) 
    
Development Assistance    NODA Total Net Official Development Assistance (% of GDP)  World Bank (WDI) 
    
Trade openness  Trade Imports plus Exports in commodities (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
    
WDI: World Bank Development Indicators.  FDSD: Financial Development and Structure Database.  
 
Appendix 2: Summary Statistics (2000-2011) 
  
 Variables Mean S.D Min. Max. Observations 
       
 
 
Financial 
Development 
Economic Financial Depth (M2) 33.045 22.112 4.129 112.83 561 
Financial System Depth (Fdgdp)  26.882 20.888 1.690 97.823 561 
Banking  System Efficiency (BcBd)  68.032 29.020 14.106 171.85 606 
Financial System Efficiency (FcFd) 73.540 37.419 13.753 260.66 561 
Banking System Activity (Pcrb) 18.763 17.452 0.551 86.720 561 
Financial System Activity (Pcrbof) 20.635 23.495 0.010 149.77 563 
Financial Size (Dbacba) 74.276 22.454 2.982 99.999 602 
       
Financial  
Globalization 
Uncertainty  
FDI Uncertainty  (FDIUn) 2.217 4.970 0.001 67.351 409 
       
 
Control 
Variables 
Economic Prosperity (GDPg) 4.682 5.761 32.832 63.379 608   
Inflation 56.216 1020.10 -9.797 24411 574 
Public Investment 7.457 4.437 0 43.011 546 
Development Assistance  10.576 12.608 -0.251 147.05 615 
Trade Openness (Trade) 78.672 35.101 22.353 209.87 599   
       
S.D: Standard Deviation.  Min: Minimum. Max: Maximum. M2: Money Supply. Fdgdp: Financial deposits(liquid liabilities). BcBd: Bank credit 
on Bank deposits. FcFd: Financial credit on Financial deposits. Pcrb: Private domestic credit from deposit banks. Pcrbof: Private domestic credit 
from deposit banks and other financial institutions. Dbacba: Deposit bank assets on central bank assets plus deposit bank assets. FDIUn: Foreign 
Direct Investment Uncertainty. GDPg: GDP growth.  
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        Appendix 3: Correlation Analysis (Uniform sample size : 321)  
          
Financial Development Dynamics  Other variables  
Financial Depth Financial Efficiency Financial Activity Fin. Size       
M2 Fdgdp BcBd FcFd Prcb Pcrbof Dbacba GDPg Inflation PubIvt NODA Trade FDIUn  
1.000 0.975 0.075 0.088 0.819 0.653 0.385 -0.110 -0.079 0.048 -0.257 0.126 -0.168 M2 
 1.000 0.110 0.197 0.880 0.751 0.436 -0.096 -0.064 0.062 -0.283 0.141 -0.167 Fdgdp 
  1.000 0.864 0.487 0.490 0.243 -0.054 -0.128 -0.212 -0.088 -0.156 0.031 Bcbd 
   1.000 0.570 0.730 0.240 -0.078 -0.087 -0.182 -0.140 -0.178 0.002 FcFd 
    1.000 0.924 0.471 -0.098 -0.085 -0.072 -0.303 0.095 -0.119 Pcrb 
     1.000 0.411 -0.098 -0.070 -0.071 -0.293 0.022 -0.100 Pcrbof 
      1.000 -0.028 -0.140 0.169 -0.385 0.229 -0.102 Dbacba 
       1.000 -0.155 0.152 0.078 0.081 0.327 GDPg 
        1.000 -0.082 0.007 -0.015 -0.018 Inflation  
         1.000 0.027 0.014 0.086 PubIvt 
          1.000 -0.318 -0.074 NODA 
           1.000 0.298 Trade 
            1.000 FDIUn 
              
          M2: Money Supply. Fdgdp: Financial deposits(liquid liabilities). BcBd: Bank credit on bank deposits. FcFd: Financial credit on Financial deposits. Pcrb: Private domestic credit from  
          deposit banks. Pcrbof: Private domestic credit from deposit banks and other financial institutions. Dbacba: Deposit bank assets on central bank assets plus deposit bank assets. FDIUn:  
          Foreign Direct Investment Uncertainty. GDPg: GDP growth. PubIvt: Public Investment. NODA: Net Official Development Assistance. Fin: Financial.   
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Appendix 4: Persistence of the dependent variables  
        
 Financial Depth Financial Efficiency Financial Activity Fin. Size 
 M2 Fdgdp BcBd FcFd Pcrd Pcrdof Dbacba 
M2(-1) 0.9819       
Fdgdp(-1)  0.9882      
BcBd(-1)   0.9282     
FcFd(-1)    0.9717    
Pcrd (-1)     0.9912   
Pcrdof(-1)      0.9940  
Dbacba(-1)       0.9338 
        
M2: Money Supply. Fdgdp: Financial deposits(liquid liabilities). BcBd: Bank credit on bank deposits. FcFd: Financial credit on Financial 
deposits. Pcrb: Private domestic credit from  deposit banks. Pcrbof: Private domestic credit from deposit banks and other financial 
institutions. Dbacba: Deposit bank assets on central bank assets plus deposit bank assets. M2(-1): Lagged value of Money Supply. Fin: 
Financial.  
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